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INTERNATIONAL LAW
On The RoadAgain:
Driving Through The Barriers To InternationalLitigation
By Michael P. Waxman
Volkswagenwerk Aktengesellschaft
V.
HerwigJ. Schlunk
(Docket No. 86.1052)
Argued March21,1988
Schlunk is another skirmish In a series of transnational
battles testing the power of the American judiciary in light of
International conventions addressing judicial power conflicts
among sovereigns. While these treaties are ostensibly intend-
ed to ease the access to service of process, jurisdiction,
discovery and enforcement of foreign judgments, they are
actually reflections of the sharp distinctions in the nations'
legal philosophies and practices. These cross-cultural con-
flicts go well beyond the civil versus common law distinc-
tions. Rather, they are based on the belief that American
courts exert personal and extraterritorial jurisdiction too
easily and willingly participate In the discovery excesses of a
fishing expedition passing for a legal system. For many
foreign parties and their governments, the Hague Service
Convention, much like the other judicial power and proce.
dure conventions, represents a wall to separate them, as
much as possible, from the legal visigoths In America.
ISSUE
In Schlunk, the Court must determine whether an Ameri-
can plaintiff can circumvent the procedures set forth in the
Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters by
serving process on a foreign defendant's agent within the
court's jurisdiction.
FACMS
At its factual foundation, Schlunk is a standard products
liability action. On December 17, 1983, Franz and Sylvia
Schlunk, who are the parents of Herwig Schlunk, a party in
this action, and his two brothers and sister were killed on an
Illinois highway. The car they were riding In was a 1978
Volkswagen Rabbit which had been designed, manufactured
and tested In West Germany by Volkswagenwerk Aktienge-
sellschaft, a West German corporation (VWAG). The car was
sold in the United States through VWAG's wholly-owned
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subsidiary, Volkswagen of America (VWoA)-a New Jersey
corporation with its principal place of business in Troy,
Michigan.
Schlunk brought a suit against VWAG in the Circuit Court
of Cook County, Illinois for wrongful death due to a design
defect which rendered the car uncrashworthy. Because
VWAG is neither authorized to transact business in Illinois
nor a resident, Schlunk served an alias summons and com-
plaint on VWAG by serving the agent VWoA (through CT
Corporation System) addressed to VWoA "as agent for"
VWAG.
VWAG responded by asserting that the service was inval-
Id. It argued that since it Is neither authorized to transact
business In Illinois nor a resident, but instead, a subject of a
foreign sovereign signatory to the Hague Service Conven-
tion, that Convention is the exclusive means to serve It.
Further, this exclusivity applied even though Illinois might
provide other methods of service.
The Circuit Court of Cook County denied VWAG's mo-
tion to quash service. The court found that, despite VWAG's
failure formally to appoint VWoA as its agent for service of
process, VWAG and VWoA are so closely related and VWAG
exhibits such pervasive control of its wholly-owned subsid-
iary, that VWoA is an agent for service of process as a matter of
law. Since service was accomplished through the imputed
local agent, the Hague Service Convention was not relevant
because it applies only to service of process outside the
.United States.
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the circuit court's
decision (145 14 App. 3d 594 (1986)). It reasoned that since
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
permits service on agents selected by foreign persons within
the forum state, notwithstanding the Hague Service Conven-
tion, the existence of an agency relationship, however it
came about, is sufficient to effect service properly. The court
upheld the circuit court's finding that VWoA was the agent of
VWAG.
The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The United States Supreme Court has wrestled almost
annually for the past few years with the breadth of the power
of American courts, the restrictions on this power by interna.
tional treaties and alternative dispute resolution mecha-
nisms.
In Schlunk the Court must address two issues:
1. What kind of agency, if any, circumvents the require-
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ments of the Hague Service Convention? and
2. Does the specific language of the treaty, requiring its
procedures when the occasion involves transmitting doc-
uments for service abroad, mean that the agent's transmis-
sion of the served documents (and notice) triggers the
Convention's procedure?
Service on the agents of foreign parties (beyond those
specifically appointed by foreign principals) has been the
basis of much judicial discussion. Most lower federal and
state courts have segregated the agency issue Into two
categories: common law agents and statutorily-appointed
agents. The courts have generally upheld service on the
common law agents of foreign principals without compli-
ance with the Hague Service Convention. They have rea-
soned that if the purported agent and principal are so closely
connected that a common law agency Is clear, the foreign
principal will receive the documents and notice which are
the heart of the service standard. In Schlunk the agent (CT
Corporation System) of an agent (VWoA) was served.
Understandably, the purported foreign principals and
their governments look to the higher purposes and require-
ments of the Hague Service Convention rather than the
concerns of the American court and its judicial system. In
addition to the enforcement of international obligations,
purported foreign principals and their sovereigns are con-
cerned about the nexus which will be required to constitute
the common law agency relationship.
At the same time, American courts have generally re-
quired compliance with the Hague Service Convention
where statutorily-appointed agents are involved. This distinc-
tion seems appropriate from an American perspective. If one
chooses an agent voluntarily, whether by specific direction
or by clear action (subject to the varying standards of com-
mon law agency as found by different state courts), proper
service upon the agent ensures the notice and document will
be delivered to the principal. Conversely, an arbitrarily ap-
pointed agency established solely by statute would thrust
together two unwilling allies. The forced relationship would
not provide the security that notice and document delivery
had been properly made.
Of course, even having established an agency relationship
acceptable for United States judicial purposes, the question
remains whether the Hague Service Convention requires a
higher standard and compliance. In Societe Natlonale Indus-
trilelle Aerospatlale v. United States District Court (107 S. Ct
2542 (1987); Preview, 1986-87 term, pp. 213-15), the Court
considered the "plain language" of the Hague Evidence
Convention and found that it was not the exclusive means for
discovery of evidence In the control of a foreign defendant in
their country, but proper before an American court.
The plain language of the Hague Service Convention
states the Convention will apply only If there was an "occa-
sion to transmit a ... document for service abroad." One
question in this case is whether the service of process here
was validly completed before the foreign defendant was
ultimately notified. The Illinois courts clearly believe that
the service on the common law agent completed the service
requirements and, therefore, the transmission to the foreign
defendant by the agent Is a matter between the principal and
the agent, not the court and the foreign defendant. Thus,
since service of process was physically completed on United
States territory, then the service, like United States-based
discovery, should not be subject to an international conven-
tion. The foreign party having selected an agent here,
through that agent avails Itself of a state's legal rights and
legal duties.
The key to VWAG's argument is that this makes a virtual
mockery of the Hague Service Convention. The very benefits
and protections bargained for in the Hague Service Conven-
tion will be circumvented. Due to the failures of a purported
agent, the purported foreign principal may never know that
any agency relationship Is being asserted. This would go to
the very clear purpose of the treaty-ensuring proper and
efficient notice in a manner that preserves the due process
rights of the litigants.
ARGUMENTS
For VolksWagenuw* Akidengesefschbf (Counsel of Re.
cord, Stephen M. Shapiro, 2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC20006 telephone (202) 463-2000)
1. The decision of the Illinois Appellate Court conflicts with
the literal language of the Hague Service Convention and
disregards settled rules of treaty interpretation.
2. The interpretation of the Hague Service Convention
adopted by the Illinois Appellate Court creates conflicts
among Its provisions and nullifies Its explicit guarantees,
frustrating its purposes.
For HerwlgJ. Scbhhmk (Counsel of Record, Jack Samuel
Ring 69 W. Washington Street, Chicago, IL 60602 telephone
(312) 782-5462.
1. Service on VWoA as agent of VWAG complies with due
process of law as guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.
2. The Hague Convention on Service of Process Abroad
does not apply to service upon an agent of a foreign
corporation within the United States.
3. Service in this case does not offend concepts of interna.
tional comity.
AMICUS ARGUMEN_5
In SupportofVoAkwgenme*Akdengesescb
The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the Unit-
ed States, Inc. and the Product Liability Advisory Council,
Inc.; the Federal Republic of Germany
In Support ofHerwigJ. Scbkmk
The United States and the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America
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